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Bad Blood: Secrets and Lies in a Silicon Valley Startup (English Edition) Kindle版
“Chilling ... Reads like a thriller ... Carreyrou tells [the Theranos story] virtually to perfection.” —The New York Times Book Review
In 2014, Theranos founder and CEO Elizabeth Holmes was widely seen as the next Steve Jobs: a brilliant Stanford dropout whose startup “unicorn” promised to revolutionize the medical industry with its breakthrough device, which performed the whole range of laboratory tests from a single drop of blood. Backed by investors such as Larry Ellison and Tim Draper, Theranos sold shares in a fundraising round that valued the company at more than $9 billion, putting Holmes’s worth at an estimated $4.5 billion. There was just one problem: The technology didn’t work. Erroneous results put patients in danger, leading to misdiagnoses and unnecessary treatments. All the while, Holmes and her partner, Sunny Balwani, worked to silence anyone who voiced misgivings—from journalists to their own employees.
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商品の説明
レビュー
[Holmes') story is a parable about Silicon Valley delusion, but the gossipy fun comes from seeing which high-profile man (James Mattis, Joe Biden) gets drawn into Holmes’ scammy web next. -- ‘Best Books of 2018’ ― ELLE
In this Silicon Valley drama, he opens his reporter’s notebook to deliver a tale of corporate fraud and legal browbeating that reads like a crime thriller. -- The 10 Best Nonfiction Books of 2018 ― TIME
Simply one of the best books about a startup ever. ― Forbes
A beautifully controlled narrative that challenges the gold-rush mentality of Silicon Valley. -- Lionel Barber, Editor of the FT, 'Books of the Year 2018' ― Financial Times
Carreyrou tells the full, gripping tale of how he slayed the “unicorn” in a fascinating look at how buzz and billions can blind people to facts. -- ‘Best Books of 2018’ ― Marie Claire
I couldn’t put down this thriller with a tragic ending . . . a book so compelling that I couldn’t turn away . . . This book has everything: elaborate scams, corporate intrigue, magazine cover stories, ruined family relationships, and the demise of a company once valued at nearly $10 billion -- Bill Gates, '5 books I loved in 2018'
Gripping . . . Carreyrou presents the scientific, human, legal and social sides of the story in full . . . He unveils many dark secrets of Theranos that have not previously been laid bare. ― Nature
A dazzling story of deception in Silicon Valley . . . You will not be able to put this book down. ― Washington Post
You will not be able to put this down. -- Top tech book releases in 2018 ― Evening Standard
Bad Blood reveals a crucial truth: outside observers must act as the eyes, the ears and, most importantly, the voice of Silicon Valley’s blind spot . . . It gambled not with our smart phones, our attention or our democracy, but with people’s lives. ― Paste
Riveting . . . a blistering critique of Silicon Valley . . . The real heroes, though, are his sources: the young scientists who worked at the company and risked their reputations and careers by voicing their concerns. Were it not for their courage, Theranos might still be testing blood today -- David Crow ― Financial Times
If you’re looking for an engaging non-fiction read, look no further than Bad Blood . . . a pacy, compelling narrative about white-collar crime that’s as incredible as any work of fiction. ― Irish Times
Carreyrou tells the story virtually to perfection . . . Bad Blood reads like a West Coast version of All the President’s Men. ― New York Times Book Review
Engaging ― The Economist
抜粋
November 17, 2006
Tim Kemp had good news for his team.
The former IBM executive was in charge of bioinformatics at Theranos, a startup with a cutting-edge blood-testing system. The company had just completed its first big live demonstration for a pharmaceutical company. Elizabeth Holmes, Theranos’s twenty-two-year-old founder, had flown to Switzerland and shown off the system’s capabilities to executives at Novartis, the European drug giant.
“Elizabeth called me this morning,” Kemp wrote in an email to his fifteen-person team. “She expressed her thanks and said that, ‘it was perfect!’ She specifically asked me to thank you and let you all know her appreciation. She additionally mentioned that Novartis was so impressed that they have asked for a proposal and have expressed interest in a financial arrangement for a project. We did what we came to do!”
This was a pivotal moment for Theranos. The three-year-old startup had progressed from an ambitious idea Holmes had dreamed up in her Stanford dorm room to an actual product a huge multinational corporation was interested in using.
Word of the demo’s success made its way upstairs to the second floor, where senior executives’ offices were located.
One of those executives was Henry Mosley, Theranos’s chief financial officer. Mosley had joined Theranos eight months earlier, in March 2006. A rumpled dresser with piercing green eyes and a laid-back personality, he was a veteran of Silicon Valley’s technology scene. After growing up in the Washington, D.C. area and getting his MBA at the University of Utah, he’d come out to California in the late 1970s and never left. His first job was at chipmaker Intel, one of the Valley’s pioneers. He’d later gone on to run the finance departments of four different tech companies, taking two of them public. Theranos was far from his first rodeo.
What had drawn Mosley to Theranos was the talent and experience gathered around Elizabeth. She might be young, but she was surrounded by an all-star cast. The chairman of her board was Donald L. Lucas, the venture capitalist who had groomed billionaire software entrepreneur Larry Ellison and helped him take Oracle Corporation public in the mid-1980s. Lucas and Ellison had both put some of their own money into Theranos.
Another board member with a sterling reputation was Channing Robertson, the associate dean of Stanford’s School of Engineering. Robertson was one of the stars of the Stanford faculty. His expert testimony about the addictive properties of cigarettes had forced the tobacco industry to enter into a landmark $6.5 billion settlement with the state of Minnesota in the late 1990s. Based on the few interactions Mosley had had with him, it was clear Robertson thought the world of Elizabeth.
Theranos also had a strong management team. Kemp had spent thirty years at IBM. Diane Parks, Theranos’s chief commercial officer, had twenty-five years of experience at pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies. John Howard, the senior vice president for products, had overseen Panasonic’s chip-making subsidiary. It wasn’t often that you found executives of that caliber at a small startup.
It wasn’t just the board and the executive team that had sold Mosley on Theranos, though. The market it was going after was huge. Pharmaceutical companies spent tens of billions of dollars on clinical trials to test new drugs each year. If Theranos could make itself indispensable to them and capture a fraction of that spending, it could make a killing.
Elizabeth had asked him to put together some financial projections she could show investors. The first set of numbers he’d come up with hadn’t been to her liking, so he’d revised them upward. He was a little uncomfortable with the revised numbers, but he figured they were in the realm of the plausible if the company executed perfectly. Besides, the venture capitalists startups courted for funding knew that startup founders overstated these forecasts. It was part of the game. VCs even had a term for it: the hockey-stick forecast. It showed revenue stagnating for a few years and then magically shooting up in a straight line.
The one thing Mosley wasn’t sure he completely understood was how the Theranos technology worked. When prospective investors came by, he took them to see Shaunak Roy, Theranos’s cofounder. Shaunak had a Ph.D. in chemical engineering. He and Elizabeth had worked together in Robertson’s research lab at Stanford.
Shaunak would prick his finger and milk a few drops of blood from it. Then he would transfer the blood to a white plastic cartridge the size of a credit card. The cartridge would slot into a rectangular box the size of a toaster. The box was called a reader. It extracted a data signal from the cartridge and beamed it wirelessly to a server that analyzed the data and beamed back a result. That was the gist of it.
When Shaunak demonstrated the system to investors, he pointed them to a computer screen that showed the blood flowing through the cartridge inside the reader. Mosley didn’t really grasp the physics or chemistries at play. But that wasn’t his role. He was the finance guy. As long as the system showed a result, he was happy. And it always did.
***
Elizabeth was back from Switzerland a few days later. She sauntered around with a smile on her face, more evidence that the trip had gone well, Mosley figured. Not that that was unusual. Elizabeth was often upbeat. She had an entrepreneur’s boundless optimism. She liked to use the term “extra-ordinary,” with “extra” written in italics and a hyphen for emphasis, to describe the Theranos mission in her emails to staff. It was a bit over the top, but she seemed sincere and Mosley knew that evangelizing was what successful startup founders did in Silicon Valley. You didn’t change the world by being cynical.
What was odd, though, was that the handful of colleagues who’d accompanied Elizabeth on the trip didn’t seem to share her enthusiasm. Some of them looked outright downcast.
Did someone’s puppy get run over? Mosley wondered half jokingly. He wandered downstairs, where most of the company’s sixty employees sat in clusters of cubicles, and looked for Shaunak. Surely Shaunak would know if there was any problem he hadn’t been told about.
At first, Shaunak professed not to know anything. But Mosley sensed he was holding back and kept pressing him. Shaunak gradually let down his guard and allowed that the Theranos 1.0, as Elizabeth had christened the blood-testing system, didn’t always work. It was kind of a crapshoot, actually, he said. Sometimes you could coax a result from it and sometimes you couldn’t.
This was news to Mosley. He thought the system was reliable. Didn’t it always seem to work when investors came to view it?
Well, there was a reason it always seemed to work, Shaunak said. The image on the computer screen showing the blood flowing through the cartridge and settling into the little wells was real. But you never knew whether you were going to get a result or not. So they’d recorded a result from one of the times it worked. It was that recorded result that was displayed at the end of each demo.
Mosley was stunned. He thought the results were extracted in real time from the blood inside the cartridge. That was certainly what the investors he brought by were led to believe. What Shaunak had just described sounded like a sham. It was OK to be optimistic and aspirational when you pitched investors, but there was a line not to cross. And this, in Mosley’s view, crossed it.
So, what exactly had happened with Novartis? Mosley couldn’t get a straight answer from anyone, but he now suspected some similar sleight of hand. And he was right. One of the two readers Elizabeth took to Switzerland had malfunctioned when they got there. The employees she brought with her had stayed up all night trying to get it to work. To mask the problem during the demo the next morning, Tim Kemp’s team in California had beamed over a fake result.
***
Mosley had a weekly meeting with Elizabeth scheduled for that afternoon. When he entered her office, he was immediately reminded of her charisma. She had the presence of someone much older than she was. The way she trained her big blue eyes on you without blinking made you feel like the center of the world. It was almost hypnotic. Her voice added to the mesmerizing effect: she spoke in an unusually deep baritone.
Mosley decided to let the meeting run its natural course before bringing up his concerns. Theranos had just closed its third round of funding. By any measure, it was a resounding success: the company had raised another $32 million from investors, on top of the $15 million raised in its first two funding rounds. The most impressive number was its new valuation: one hundred and sixty-five million dollars. There weren’t many three-year-old startups that could say they were worth that much.
One big reason for the rich valuation was the agreements Theranos told investors it had reached with pharmaceutical partners. A slide deck listed six deals with five companies that would generate revenues of $120 million to $300 million over the next eighteen months. It listed another fifteen deals under negotiation. If those came to fruition, revenues could eventually reach $1.5 billion, according to the PowerPoint presentation.
The pharmaceutical companies were going to use Theranos’s blood-testing system to monitor patients’ response to new drugs. The cartridges and readers would be placed in patients’ homes during clinical trials. Patients would prick their fingers several times a day and the readers would beam their blood-test results to the trial’s sponsor. If the results indicated a bad reaction to the drug, the drug’s maker would be able to lower the dosage immediately rather than wait until the end of the trial. This would reduce pharmaceutical companies’ research costs by as much as 30 percent. Or so the slide deck said.
Mosley’s unease with all these claims had grown since that morning’s discovery. For one thing, in his eight months at Theranos, he’d never laid eyes on the pharmaceutical contracts. Every time he inquired about them, he was told they were “under legal review.” More important, he’d agreed to those ambitious revenue forecasts because he thought the Theranos system worked reliably.
If Elizabeth shared any of these misgivings, she showed no signs of it. She was the picture of a relaxed and happy leader. The new valuation, in particular, was a source of great pride. New directors might join the board to reflect the growing roster of investors, she told him.
Mosley saw an opening to broach the trip to Switzerland and the office rumors that something had gone wrong. When he did, Elizabeth admitted that there had been a problem, but she shrugged it off. It would easily be fixed, she said.
Mosley was dubious given what he now knew. He brought up what Shaunak had told him about the investor demos. They should stop doing them if they weren’t completely real, he said. “We’ve been fooling investors. We can’t keep doing that.”
Elizabeth’s expression suddenly changed. Her cheerful demeanor of just moments ago vanished and gave way to a mask of hostility. It was like a switch had been flipped. She leveled a cold stare at her chief financial officer.
“Henry, you’re not a team player,” she said in an icy tone. “I think you should leave right now.”
There was no mistaking what had just happened. Elizabeth wasn’t merely asking him to get out of her office. She was telling him to leave the company—immediately. Mosley had just been fired.
著者について
John Carreyrou is a member of the Wall Street Journal’s investigative reporting team. He joined the Journal in 1999 and has been based in Brussels, Paris, and New York for the paper, winning two Pulitzer prizes.
John has covered a number of topics during his career, ranging from Islamist terrorism when he was on assignment in Europe to the pharmaceutical industry and the U.S. healthcare system. His reporting on corruption in the field of spine surgery led to long prison terms for a California hospital owner and a Michigan neurosurgeon. His reporting on Theranos, a blood-testing startup founded by Elizabeth Holmes, was recognized with a George Polk award, and is chronicled in his book Bad Blood: Secrets and Lies in a Silicon Valley Startup.
Born in New York and raised in Paris, he currently resides in Brooklyn with his wife and three children.
登録情報
- ASIN : B078VW3VM7
- 出版社 : Vintage; 第1版 (2018/5/21)
- 発売日 : 2018/5/21
- 言語 : 英語
- ファイルサイズ : 13644 KB
- Text-to-Speech(テキスト読み上げ機能) : 有効
- X-Ray : 有効
- Word Wise : 有効
- 付箋メモ : Kindle Scribeで
- 本の長さ : 353ページ
- Amazon 売れ筋ランキング: - 22,672位洋書 (洋書の売れ筋ランキングを見る)
- カスタマーレビュー:
著者について

著者の本をもっと発見したり、よく似た著者を見つけたり、著者のブログを読んだりしましょう
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トップレビュー
上位レビュー、対象国: 日本
レビューのフィルタリング中に問題が発生しました。後でもう一度試してください。
The book is written by journalist John Carreyrou and covers the rise and fall of a biotech startup called Theranos which was founded by a Stanford dropout Elizabeth Holmes.
It starts from how the 19 year old dropout thought of a brilliant idea of being able to perform blood tests with a drop of blood and how she managed to get funds from the most respected donors and started a company in Silicon valley. Then it goes on to talk about how she and her boyfriend (also the CEO of the company) scammed many highly accomplished people and put the lives of people at stake by claiming that the machine her company invented could do more than 40 tests by a mere drop of blood accurately despite the contradictory results when compared with other industrial blood analyzer.
She also appeared on Tedtalks, was an honorary member of Harvard University and appeared on the covers of Forbes and Fortune.
This book is not only about the drama that unfolds as the duo's corporate fraud gets bigger, but also about nepotism, the tyrannical way the company was managed, the stress and the harassment the staffs faced and many more. I am sure people working in the field of health sector will particularly enjoy this fast pace book.
Congratulations on the story and thank you very much for helping our society get a little better
中身に問題なく、交換するほどではありませんが。
気にしすぎかもしれませんが、
新品を注文したのに、開封したとたんに汚れが目に入ったので
がっかりしました。
本屋さんで見たら買わなかったと思います。
★★★読後感です
中身がとても面白かったので、評価を上げました。
NYタイムズに「スリラーのようだ」と評されていたらしいですが、
百戦錬磨のアメリカの大物たちがコロリと騙されていく姿には、
まさに戦慄を覚えました。
こんなことが、現代のアメリカ、しかもシリコンバレーで起きていたとは・・・。
登場人物が多くて混乱するところもありましたが、
読みやすい本でした。
他の国からのトップレビュー


,

This is the story of the failed start-up company known as Theranos and its CEO Elizabeth Holmes. Elizabeth Holmes was young, brilliant, attractive, and incredibly ambitious. She dropped out of college at the young age of nineteen, not because she couldn’t handle it nor didn’t like it, but because she was too impatient. She was ready to take over the world and didn’t want to waste time waiting to get a college degree. The company she founded, Theranos, had a very attractive idea that would revolutionize healthcare. The premise? When patients needed extensive blood work, they would no longer need to subject themselves to long needles that would drain a substantial amount of blood to fill up multiple test tubes to perform tests. Holmes set out to create a device that would simply prick a patient’s finger, take a miniscule amount of blood, hook it up to a relatively small box, and within a short amount of time, this little box could perform the extensive tests and give the patient their results in a fraction of the amount of time.
Well, to sum it up, the idea may have been revolutionary, but it simply couldn’t work. Holmes was so persuasive, though, that she convinced many of the wealthy that it could, and managed to raise millions and millions of dollars to try to make her dream a reality. When you end up spending the millions and millions of dollars on your idea that never comes to fruition, what do you do? Author Carreyrou argues that Holmes hemmed, hawed, lied, deceived and stole to masquerade this unpleasant fact. I got the impression that she wasn’t really that bad of a person (initially anyway), yet got so sucked in by her ambition and greed, that she simply couldn’t accept failure as being an option. This kind of behavior, sadly, isn’t that uncommon. We read stories all the time of successful entrepreneurs who plow ahead after continuous failures. Those who make the headlines are the rare few that actually succeeded against insurmountable obstacles. What we don’t read about are the failures; which probably outweigh the successes by a ratio about 100 to 1. Who wants to read about failures? Unless, of course, you have a story as compelling as this one.
The author is a journalist for the Wall Street Journal, and is actually a part of the story. He pens a piece for his paper that exposes much of the fraud, yet we don’t read about his first-hand recollections until probably 2/3 of the way through the story. Each chapter that he writes is captivating in that he focuses on so many of the key players. Not only do we read about Holmes and her lover/business partner Sunny Balwani, but we read about disgruntled employees, employees who are terminated, employees who are threatened by high pressure lawyers, doctors, patients, lab technicians, investors, and acquaintances. All of them are crucial when reading about this train wreck.
For me, the highlights are what goes on within the walls of the company. Holmes and Balwani run the startup as authoritarian dictators, and you get the impression that working for this company would be a nightmare. I couldn’t understand why so many of the employees stayed as long as they did. Example: Not only were the different departments not allowed to speak to one and other, but when outside people were brought in for meetings, they weren’t even allowed to use the restroom without being “escorted” to do their business. They didn’t trust outsiders roaming the hallways. Another example: We read about an engineer who worked for the company who designs a lighting system for his bicycle on his free time. When Holmes finds out about this, she’s exasperated. Why? Because her employees should not have any “free time”. She expects them to spend every waking minute of their lives at the office trying to make her impossible dream a reality. This book, I think, could also serve as a case study for companies in teaching management how NOT to treat their employees.
When employees quit, they’re threatened by Holmes and Balwani not to say ANYTHING about the company. They then spy on ex-employees, and if the individual makes a passing comment, say, to a friend over dinner, the ex-employee next finds a team of threatening lawyers at their front doorstep with a 25 page lawsuit. In fact, the author himself was threatened many times by these intimidating malcontents. Fortunately, he’s been in the business long enough to know about these scare tactics, and isn’t in the least bit afraid to write about what he knows.
So another story about a high-profile company that failed, and all of the dirty deeds done to cover it up. What makes this story a bit scary is that the author alleges that such unethical activities happen all of the time when startups are trying to blunder their way to the top. What makes this company unique, however, is that it’s dealing with the health of people. So it’s ok if you design a piece of software “full of bugs” and somehow deceive the public, but it’s a definite no-no when your errors can cause a faltered result on a patient’s blood test. I say “scary” because it really does cause one to be wary of any kind of “new” technology being implemented. Who are we to trust?
As I write this review Homes and Balwani have yet to go to trial. Of course, Holmes maintains her innocence. I don’t see how anyone could believe her based on what this story uncovers. It will be interesting to see the eventual outcome. A really sad story. Sure, it’s great to be young, ambitious, and chase big dreams, but when those dreams don’t come true, one needs to admit failure and not try to consistently cover it up. So many people still can’t seem to find the courage to admit that they just might be wrong about some things.

Die Story ist packend und obwohl man weiß, wie es ausgeht, baut sie sehr gut Spannung bis zum Finale (der Veröffentlichung von Carreyrous Artikel) auf. Unglaublich, wie viele Mitarbeitenden bei Theranos verschlissen wurden und sich vollkommen überarbeitet haben, um das Schiff zu retten. Bei vielen ging es nicht gut aus. Das nimmt man Elizabeth Holmes (neben dem Betrug der Investoren natürlich) beim Lesen sehr übel. Was für eine schreckliche Chefin.
Man lernt auch viel über die medizinische Technik hinter Bluttests.
